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Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between innovation and economic growth in sub-
Sahara Africa taking into account the role of institutional development. This is against the 
backdrop that institution is the oil that greases the wheels of development. Using the number of 
scientific journals published as proxy for innovation and GDP per capita for economic growth, we 
assess a panel of 25 economies in sub-Sahara Africa with dataset (1996-2016) from reliable 
agencies such as World Bank, Polity IV, Heritage foundation, Elsevier Scopus (Scimago) and 
Economic Freedom of the World Project (EFW). Our evidence suggest among other things that 
innovation has a positive and significant effect on the growth trajectory of sub-Sahara Africa 
although the impact seems negligible. Institutional quality is seen to dampen innovation and the 
relation is persistent regardless of when the focus is on aggregate or decomposed institutional 
factors. While most countries in the region have offered financial support in strengthening 
institutions, we find barriers to the design and implementation of STI policies to be responsible for 
the sluggish contribution of innovation to the growth pattern in the region. Therefore a lot more 
has to be done in the area of coordination and finding the right mix of financing option in 
supporting the activities of public organizations and parastatals when it comes to the design and 
implementation of STI policies. 
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1. Introduction 
Growth in sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) has been sluggish and for the past four decades, the 
region has had to endure a semblance of recession given the fragile nature of its economies. 
Consequently, there has as a result been increasing attempt to dissect on the challenges faced by 
the region through deliberation on the cause of the region’s plight. Conspicuous among factors 
considered include political instability, governance, geographical location and corruption among 
others (Alesina & Weder, 2002; Bingab et al., 2018; Boudreaux, 2017; Forson, 2016a; Forson et 
al., 2016; Forson et al., 2017; Pellegrini, 2011). Notwithstanding, issues of diversification that may 
bring about structural change have not been addressed adequately in political and academic 
discourses. The financial sector which is thought to be the architect of these changes seem to lack 
innovation and this has thus stifled progress that has affected segments of the economy. This 
observation is shared by Durusu-Ciftci et al. (2017), who assert that the financial sector of an 
economy to a large extent, ought to serve as a conduit for changes such as the introduction of new 
financial instruments, institutions, services, among others to induce economic growth. 
Innovation is essential and has no limit, yet its impact on certain key sectors of an economy 
can trigger what we call the multiplier effect (Peng et al., 2020).  The concept of innovation in 
general has therefore been understood to include both the concept of invention (the ongoing 
research and development function) and diffusion of new products, services or ideas (Casu et al. 
2008:pp.39). Yet in the financial sector, financial innovation is the act of creating and making 
known new financial instruments as well as new financial technologies, institutions and markets 
(Casu et al. 2008:pp.39). Nonetheless the fundamental meaning of innovation in Africa seems to 
have been misunderstood in its entirety and that has been the reason the region continues to lag. 
Whiles the normative idea of innovation seem to have been linked to hi-tech, in truism, innovation 
is more than just technology. According to Lepage (2017), innovation is not hi-tech; innovation 
is 5% technology and 95% imagination. He emphasized that at a practical level, it is about 
examining pressure points and thinking about creative ways of dealing with that (Forson, 
2019, 2020). 
Thus, Africa’s failure to embrace this creative thinking has affected the structure of its 
economy. Researchers such as Oyelaran-Oyeyinka (2012), Moghalu (2014) and Lepage (2017) 
have collectively described sub-Sahara Africa as a ‘latecomer’ to demonstrate how sluggish the 
Page 3 of 35 
 
region has been in embracing new ideas leading to technological advancement. Thus for the region 
to make any meaningful strides would mean there should be a structural change. According to 
Oyelaran-Oyeyinka (2014), economic structural change is measured by quantifiable structural shift 
(i.e. GDP or employment share of the sector explained by the level of development). This situation 
includes observable economic transformation, followed by significant changes to the relative 
contribution of different sectors, in terms of production and factor use. That has not been achieved 
holistically.  
It has been argued in other circles that sub-Sahara’s challenges could be as a result of 
disjointed implementation of industrial policy spear-headed by a lack of innovation on a 
continuum. As pointed out in a report published by UNCTAD (2006),  an economic transformation 
is only plausible if the much needed enabling policy is put in place that will ensure the process of 
capital accumulation, structural change and technological progress. Yet this can never be achieved 
on a silver-platter except when there is that collective agreement on the part of governments within 
the region to strengthen capabilities of its people to enable them achieve structural change.  
East Asia and perhaps Latin America were once saddled with the same problem of ‘weak 
policy’ that is bedeviling Africa today, but through a focused hands-on endeavors, they have been 
able to overcome these problems using what has come to be known as ‘dynamic capability 
development’ (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2014; Sen, 2000). Large volumes of literature have indeed 
cited the East Asian phenomenon as an experience that placed premium on state institutions and 
capacity. These sources have all emphasized the need to learn lessons from successful cases that 
led to capital formation and the advancement of technological capability accumulation (see Forson, 
2016; Mcmillan & Rodrik, 2011; Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2014).  On the flipside, it has been argued 
that governments’ intervention is always susceptible to the menace of abuses such as corruption 
and inefficiency and may have accounted for its failure which is detrimental to development as 
market failure (Amsden, 1989). However, while innovation has been given a central role in the 
determination of growth elsewhere, little has been written about the drivers of innovation in sub-
Sahara Africa. 
The contribution of the paper is in two-fold: (1) to examine the role of institutional 
development on innovation and, (2) to assess the impact of innovation on economic growth. It 
must be emphasized that the more industrialized countries of East Asia and Latin America have 
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found a lasting solution to market imperfections, using extensive but context-based industrial 
policies to support the process of development through structural transformation (Oyelaran-
Oyeyinka, 2012). This has not been the case in Africa. Although there are studies that provide 
narratives of the shift in growth dynamics within the African sub region (see Adeyinka et al., 2013; 
Mcmillan & Rodrik, 2011), there are still dearth studies that explore concurrently the synergies 
between institutional development and innovation on one side and innovation and economic 
growth on another taking into account a systematic review of innovation policies in the region. 
This has important implication for deepening understanding on how the entrepreneurial spirit and 
innovation has affected the growth dynamics after independence.  
In this study, we operationally define innovation as the act of generating new ideas that are 
practical and can be translated into new instruments and technologies that can be applied at 
pressure points in an economy. It is our belief that our definition by extension draws on the three 
tenets of innovation: institution, product and processes. Having said that, the key question that rear 
its head regarding innovation drive in sub-Sahara Africa is: is there a regional framework for 
innovation to thrive? What are the segments and elements of this framework? How has institutions 
acting as fulcrum for innovation been financed? How has innovativeness of institutions impacted 
on regional economic growth? These questions and others were addressed in the study.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the extant literature on innovation and 
economic growth in general. The section further narrows its focus to explore the synergy between 
the state, institution and innovation on one side, and innovation and economic growth on another. 
Barriers to the design and implementation of STI1 policies in sub-Sahara Africa is also explored 
in this section. Section 3 is the data and methodology. Empirical analysis and discussion are 
concurrently covered in Section 4. Section 5 concludes and makes recommendation for policy 
makers in the region. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 STI and innovation are interchangeably used in this paper to mean the same thing. Note should be taken that by 
innovation, we are referring to ideas that leads to creativity and the application of these ideas at pressure points in an 
economy.  
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2. Institutions, Innovation and Economic Growth Perspectives 
2.1 The State, Institution and Innovation 
 Evans  and Reuschemeyer (1985) conceptualize the state as a set of organizations invested 
with the authority to make binding decisions for people and organizations located in a particular 
territory and to implement these decisions, if necessary by force. Drawing on the link between the 
state and institutions, Aryeetey and Kanbur (2008; pp.15) explain that the state is ‘a set of 
institutions that possesses the means of legitimate coercion, exercised over a defined territory and 
its population, known as society’. By implication, the performance of institution defines the 
progress of the state and the economy as a whole. These definitions syncs very well with what 
institutional theory postulates. 
In the conceptualization of the term institutions from literature, it is important to note that 
two main deductions could be made. The first strand of literature looks at institutions as an 
organization or entity whiles the latter aligns the term with that of a practice or law. According to 
North (1991; pp.97) institutions are the rules of the game. On a continuum, he argues that 
institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social 
interaction and may consist of both informal constraints (e.g. sanctions, taboos, customs, 
traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights). The notion 
of institutions (local, national, and international) as is generally known are far more than agencies. 
Institutions are complex social systems which thrives on relationships and networks (see de la 
Mothe, 2004; pp.526). To him, innovation arises out of complex combination of research, 
technology, and managerial acumen within the context of social demand and individual creativity. 
Successful institutions are learning organizations, able to adapt to knowledge, to network (de la 
Mothe, 2004).  
According to de la Mothe (2004), institutions are the conduit through which ideas are 
formed and flow, from government labs, firms (small and large), universities, and agencies, 
providing community services, and developing the notion of what he termed as “constructed 
advantage”. On the role of institutions when it comes to innovation policy, he emphasized 
institutions are concerned with stimulating, guiding, and monitoring knowledge-based activities 
within a political jurisdiction—typically a nation or a region. From this postulation, it is suggestive 
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that it takes the work of institutions to stimulate and guide the advancement of knowledge in a 
particular setting.  
A well-resourced institution could be a platform for innovation to thrive as they become 
the conduit where knowledge generated are given a practical significance and this has been 
researched extensively by Nelson (2008) and Rasiah et al. (2016). In supporting this assertion, 
Rasiah et al. (2016) in an attempt to examine the relationship between  host-site institutional 
support, innovation capabilities and exports observed that innovation capabilities is correlated with 
institutional support, and that it also enjoyed a positive relationship with export. At the firm level, 
Barasa et al. (2017) were able to prove that firm-level resources vary depending on the institutional 
environment and that regional institutional quality positively moderates the effects of the firm-
level resources.  
Other scholars such as Dollar and Kraay (2003) and Greif (2006) have collectively stressed 
that institutions that are properly designed can stimulate productive behaviors whiles those that 
are weak may lead to unproductive behavior. Institutions can reduce transaction costs and 
uncertainty and ease coordination between economic agents (Alonso & Garcimartin, 2013). 
Institutional quality encompasses (1) the process by which a government is selected, monitored 
and replaced (2) a government’s capacity to effectively formulate and implement sound policies 
and (3) the economic and social interactions between citizens and the state are governed 
(Kaufmann & Mastruzzi, 2013). As such, the institutional environment can influence the 
propensity of firms to innovate in a variety of ways (North, 1993). For instance, weak enforcement 
of regulations and the absence of intellectual property rights may hinder innovation. Compared to 
countries in Latin America, Southeast Asia and Middle East and North Africa, countries in sub-
Saharan Africa perform poorly in upholding the rule of law, regulatory quality, control of 
corruption and government effectiveness (Alence, 2004). 
The impact of institutions on growth is indirect because institutions do not produce goods 
and services that are tangible, yet the institutional approach posit that both the amount and 
productivity of resources depend on the institutional environment. Seputiene (2009) asserts that a 
well-defined institution reduce uncertainty, decrease macroeconomic volatility, stimulate 
specialization, lower transaction costs, and invariably foster investments and innovation. Knack 
and Keefer (1995) study is credited with being among the early contributors to this discourse with 
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a proposition that supports the assertion that institutions causes growth. In the said study, there is 
an attempt to quantify the relationship between institutions, investment, and growth using 
alternative indicators. The research findings strongly indicate that institutions that protect property 
rights are crucial to economic growth and to investment. This effect of institutions on growth 
persists even when controlled in a regression model for investment. This goes to affirm the 
preposition that the security of property rights affects not only the magnitude of investment, but 
also the efficiency with which inputs are allocated. This empirics is supported in a similar study 
by DeLong and Shleifer (1993) that asserts that good institutions in the form of predictable and 
stable rules of law, efficiency bureaucracy, and property rights security are linked with economic 
growth. 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) in a related study corroborated the effect of institution on growth 
in the European context. In the said study, the researchers treat European colonialism as a natural 
experiment and hypothesized that European colonizers imposed different types of institutions on 
their former colonies depending on whether those colonies were suitable for European settlement. 
They however conclude that institutions have a large effect on economic growth. 
The importance of institutions for economic growth in terms of per capita incomes, infant 
mortality and adult literacy have been corroborated in related studies by Kaufmann et al. (1999, 
2002). Moreover, Seputiene (2009) undertook a study aimed at exploring and quantifying the 
relationship of countries’ income level with institutional environment, geography and openness to 
trade across the European Union. He concludes that there was a strong and positive link between 
various measures of institutions and economic development. The study also supported the primacy 
of institutions over openness to trade and geography. Próchniak (2013) used variant of institutional 
inputs such as democracy, economic freedom and the ease of doing business with a confirmation 
of a large positive impact of the quality of the institutional environment on the level of economic 
development measured by the 2005-2009 GDP per capita at PPP.  
However, the most comprehensive cross-sectional study in recent times has been 
conducted by  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003) and Pellegrini (2011b). In both studies, about 100 
and 106 countries respectively have been sampled (1965-1995 and 1996-2005 respectively). Their 
results suggested that democracy, measured by electoral right from the Freedom House shows a 
nonlinear relationship with the growth rate of GDP. Moreover, they also found nonlinearities in 
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other institutional inputs like civil liberties. On the other hand, other institutional inputs like the 
quality of bureaucracy revealed a positive linear relationship on economic development. Other 
institutional factors were also tested using dummy variables that represented colony (i.e. French, 
Spanish/Portuguese etc.), landlocked and legal-structure (British and French). Rivera-Batiz (2002) 
tested political rights index compiled by the Freedom House as well as the quality of governance 
indicator compiled by Hall and Jones in 59 countries within the years 1960-1990. This research 
confirmed that the quality of governance positively and significantly affects economic growth. 
Leblang (1997) and Feng (1997) both analyzed democracy index from Gurr and Bollen for 91 and 
96 countries during 1960-1989 and 1960-1980 respectively. Institutional factors like democracy, 
the probabilities of government changes have been understudied. Both studies converged that 
initial level of democracy positively and significantly influences GDP dynamics. However, Feng’s 
study had a twofold impact: the direct impact was negatively associated with growth, whereas the 
indirect impact was positive because of the influence of the probability of government changes. 
Moreover, important regular government changes favorably affect macroeconomic 
performance, whereas irregular changes had the opposite effect. Other institutional factors like 
economic freedom and the level of democracy have been understudied on an extensive variation 
by Prochniak and Witkowski (2012; 2013) on GDP growth using an innovative method of 
Bayesian model averaging. They conclude that economic freedom is one of the main drivers of 
growth in the EU. In explaining worldwide differences in economic development, Próchniak 
(2013) concludes that differences in physical capital, human capital and the institutional 
environment (measured by governance indicators) explained nearly 75% of the differences in 
economic development among 153 countries during the period 1994-2009. In Africa, Ganau 
(2017) investigated the relationship between institutions and economic growth with a sample of 
50 countries in the region and concluded that democracy and regime instability negatively affects 
growth. Democracy, legislative effectiveness and regime instability were used as institutional 
factors whiles per capita growth GDP was a proxy for economic growth in the said study.  
In contrast, there are other studies that have had opposing views on the relationship 
between institutions and economic growth. For instance, Glaeser et al. (2004) points out that 
growth rather improves institution and that such a hypothesis regarding institutions causing growth 
is non-existent. The OLS cross-country evidence for 1960-2000 used provided no support to the 
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purported claim of institutions causing growth. Plumper and Martin (2003) analyzed the 
relationship between democracy level and growth in 83 countries within the period 1975-1997. 
They found a nonlinear relationship between democracy and economic growth. They also 
concluded that the highest GDP dynamics were recorded by those countries that have had 
relatively moderate level of democracy. Based on the foregoing perspectives, this paper 
hypothesize the following: 
H1: Institutional quality has a positive relationship with innovation  
 
2.2 Innovation and Economic Growth 
The significance of innovation on economic growth is highlighted in Schumpeter's (1942) 
theory of creative destruction, which elucidates on how capitalism pushes economic growth 
through innovation and entrepreneurship. Underpinned by the Schumpeter’s theory, extant 
literature on this relation argues that institutions that are market-based may be in better positions 
to stimulate growth and such an assertion is supported in recent research (Aristizabal-Ramirez et 
al., 2015; Boudreaux, 2017). 
The concept of innovation according to Sundbo (2003) is a combination of knowledge that 
result in new products, processes, input and output markets, or organization (not only technical 
innovation) but also organizational and managerial innovations, new markets, new sources of 
supply, innovations, and new combinations (Perlman and Heertje, 1991). To Padilla-Perez and 
Gaudin (2014), innovation is an interactive and gradual process, based on communication and 
knowledge exchange. Carayannis et al. (2006) argues that in a knowledge-based economy, 
innovation through the creation, diffusion and use of knowledge has become a catalyst in the build 
up to economic growth.  Rycroft and Kash (1999) on the other hand points out that innovation 
policy is a complex process, not a single product, but as a result of a set of programs and policies, 
involving institutions. 
Innovation however comes in different forms and facades. For instance, industrial 
innovation includes manufacturing, technical design, management and commercial activities used 
in the marketing of a new (or improved) product or the first commercial use of a new process or 
equipment (Freeman, 1982). Huang et al. (2007) are of the opinion, the factors required for 
industrial innovation are in manifold and may include technical knowledge, manpower, market 
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information, financial resources, R&D environments, a domestic market and an international 
market (Rothwell and Zegveld, 1982). Finding the right measure of innovation has given rise to 
intellectual argument. Huang et al. (2007) in a quick rebuttal had pointed out that macro measures 
such as R&D tax credit are not effective and pointless, and that policies must be designed to 
influence particular economic sectors. Product innovation differs from the generic concept, as it is 
basically the introduction of new good or service or the significant improvement of existing 
product with respect to its characteristics and intended use (Ayyagari et al. 2012; Barasa et al. 
2017). But Salmenkaita and Salo (2002) disagreed and stressed that there are no straightforward 
answers to the question of what should constitute an innovation in the generic. Dilating on what 
should best describe innovation, Lepage (2017) argues that innovation in its essence is all about 
ideas; identifying pressure points and being creative to avert the existing pressures.  
The awareness of the concept of innovation is not novel in itself, but over the last decade, 
its speed particularly in other sectors particularly the financial sector has created some challenges 
that impact financial development, including structural changes in the financial sector, the 
reshaping of financial services, and the emergence of new financial assets in the financial markets. 
Financial innovation brings to the fore and popularizes new financial instruments, institutions, and 
technologies to the financial system (Durusu-Ciftci et al. 2017). Yet Ductor and Grechyna (2015) 
demonstrates that the effect of financial innovation on economic growth may not necessarily be 
straight but is contingent on the growth of private credit relative to the real output growth. They 
therefore warned that very rapid financial development can decrease economic growth. To 
appreciate the link between innovation and growth, this paper hypothesize that: 
H2: Innovation has a positive and significant relationship with economic growth. 
 
2.3 Barriers to the Design and implementation of Innovation Policy in sub-Sahara Africa 
The study further attempts to explore the barriers to the design and implementation of 
innovation policies in the region. This is against the backdrop that technological-capability 
indicators in the region still lags behind its compatriots (see Table 1). The study profiles and briefly 
discusses the bottlenecks that have led to the ensuing situation with emphasis on three (3) main 
policy areas (e.g. institutional framework, financing and diffusion and interaction) deployed by 
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selected countries in the region (see Table A-3). These are barriers faced by governments when 
designing and implementing science, technology and innovation (STI) in Africa. 
To begin with, although there appear to be some form of political support in the design of 
innovation policies, the results from the technological-capability indicators have proved otherwise. 
Thus high-level political support for STI policies is superficial and therefore remains absent. 
Public organizations charged with the task of science and technology innovation policies 
(ministries, national council, secretariat, and parastatals) lack the resources and enough leverage 
to discretionary push their agenda. Moreover, recognition and the role of innovation to stimulate 
growth remains ambiguous, hence commitment levels being low comparatively. As posited before, 
countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Senegal and Ugandan despite increment in the 
commitment levels from 0.24%-0.61%, 0.36%-0.79%, 0.25%-0.66%, 0.37%-0.54% and 0.37%-
0.48% of GDP, is still far from appreciable levels looking at what is being done elsewhere (e.g. 
US 3.1% of GDP, and Sweden 3.4% of GDP). 
In exploring other sources of funding for STI in the region, tax incentives seem to be the 
best option, yet countries in the region are already saddled with the problem of low tax revenue 
which makes it difficult to implement the policy on tax incentives. This poses as a strong barrier 
for increased STI public investment. According to figures from the World Bank (2009) tax 
revenues as a percentage of GDP in the region is low. For instance, in Ghana, tax revenue 
accounted for just 14.87% of GDP in 2012, in Nigeria 5.46% in 2008, in South Africa 26.50% in 
2012, in Kenya 19.88% in 2012, in Tanzania 13.8% in 2012, in Cameroun 11.2%  in 1999 and 
12.46% for Angola in 2015 (World Bank, 2013). The implication therefore is that, funds for STI 
would not be forthcoming as countries are faced with more social issues that needs redress in the 
short term. 
Political instability in the region remains a barrier to the implementation of STI policies. 
Countries such as Sudan, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, and Mali have all experienced some form 
of political unrest.  As a consequence, STI programs do not always survive the entrance of new 
government. This is a common practice in Africa. In relatively stable economies, new government 
often over-look policies initiated by its predecessors irrespective of the programs impact on general 
wellbeing.  
The universities in the region are mainly focused on teaching or basic-science research 
which has a weaker link to private enterprises. Science and technology institutions that were 
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conceptualized from the outset to be the incubating grounds for entrepreneurs and inventors have 
taken to offering social science programs and business administration. For instance, universities 
such as the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and technology (KNUST) in Ghana, the 
Federal University of Technology (FUT) in Nigeria, Central university of Technology (CUT) in 
South Africa have all diluted their programs by offering more programs in the arts and social 
sciences than its pure and applied science programs which is core to its mandate. 
Coordination among public organizations and parastatals in the design and implementation 
of STI policies is weak. Departments and parastatals often elaborate their strategies but are not 
fully integrated and coordinated thereby leading to competition among these institutions. This is 
undoubtedly a barrier to improving the impact of STI policies and developing an efficient use of 
scant resources. 
Financial systems in sub-Sahara Africa are not incentivized enough to support innovation 
in the region. New entrepreneurs and existing firms hardly get access to financial sector to finance 
innovation activities. Venture capital are also almost non-existent. The gestation periods for 
actualizing the full potential of new inventions often takes time, and this is a disincentive for 
existing financial institutions which are already grabbling with liquidity and solvency risks. In 
Ghana for instance, seven big banks collapsed and merged as a result of liquidity challenges in 
less than 18 months (Nunoo, 2018). 
 
Table 1: Selected countries in sub-Sahara Africa  
Country/Indicator Nigeria 
South 
Africa Mali Kenya 
South 
Korea Brazil 
United 
States Sweden 
No. of graduates on ST areas (per 1000 
inhabitants) 0.3 0.7 0.11 0.3 na 4.3 5.1 na 
Researchers (per million inhabitants)- 2015 na 26,159 537.9 na  183,853 1,379,977 66,734 
R&D Expenditure (percentage of GDP) 0.2 0.9 0.66 0.79 3.4 1.09 3.1 3.6 
Patent applications by residents (per million 
inhabitants) 645 5 065 na 53 2745.9 37.7 801.8 2745.9 
No. of Scientific publication (per million 
inhabitants) 
 
11.4 
  
 46.4  64.2 
  
 6.6 464 187 1276.7 1053.1 
Source: Authors construct based on World Development Indicators and UNESCO indicators. All available online. 
Note: ST= Science and Technology, na = not available 
 
In summary, countries in sub-Sahara Africa are trailing behind when it comes to science, 
technology and innovation due to the foregoing barriers identified which shares commonalities 
with what pertains elsewhere: design and implementation failure and political instability (see 
Woolthuis et al. 2005), weak education systems (Aubert, 2004; Segarra-Blasco et al., 2008), lack 
of resources (Aubert, 2004), lack of financing mix (Segarra-Blasco et al. 2008) and lack of 
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coordination among public organizations and failure to monitor (Hadjimanolis & Dickson, 2001; 
Willie et al. 2016).  
 
3. Data and Methodology  
3.1 Data 
This study examines a panel of 25 economies in sub-Sahara Africa2 with the most recent 
dataset (1996–2015) from the World Bank and other reputable agencies. The criteria for selecting 
these countries was purely based on data availability. The financial sector of an economy to a large 
extent serves as a conduit for changes such as the introduction of new financial instruments, 
institutions, services, and reporting could be brought (Durusu-Ciftci et al. 2017). Yet the waves of 
innovation on the economy is diversified and therefore no single variable can be considered as an 
appropriate indicator for measuring its significance in the economy (see Qamruzzaman & Janguo, 
2017: pp.6). There are two dependent variables in this study: innovation measured by the number 
of scientific journals published and economic growth measured by GDP per capita. Our main 
research variable3 is innovation.  
The study controls for institutional and growth enhancing factors such as government 
effectiveness, corruption, size of government, bureaucratic quality, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
press freedom, population growth, economic prosperity, foreign aid inflows, natural resources, 
gross savings, Periodicals (citable documents) and Education as a measure of human capital 
endowments using primary, secondary and tertiary enrollments. Most of these variables have 
broadly been classified as policy variables in the growth literature. 
These variables have been researched extensively in the institution and growth literature 
(see Earle & Scott, 2010; Prasad, 2003; Próchniak, 2013). Based on this, we are able to rationalize 
the choice of variables in this research. The resultant summary statistics, variable descriptions and 
presentation of countries (Table A-1), and correlation matrix (Table A-2) are detailed in the 
appendix respectively. 
 
 
                                                          
2 By sub-Sahara Africa, reference is being made to black African countries excluding North Africa.  
3 The variables used in this study are lagged for a year to account for persistence. The lagged regressors on the right 
hand side of the equation is endogenous and may lead to what Nickell (1981) describes as ‘dynamic panel bias’ and 
the lagged dependent variable maybe correlated with the error term.  
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3.2 Model Specification 
To understand the relationship between institutional development and innovation, the study 
builds on Boudreaux (2017) simple OLS model presented in equation (1); 𝐼 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝐸𝐹𝑊 + 𝜀                                                                                                  (1) 
Where, 𝐼 is innovation measured by the global innovation index (GII), and 𝐸𝐹𝑊 is a 
measure of market institutions that facilitate innovation.  
Consequently to answer the question on how institutional development affects innovation 
in sub-Sahara Africa on one side and the link between innovation and economic growth in sub-
Sahara Africa on another, we expand Boudreaux (2017) model and have it presented as follows in 
equation (2) and (3) respectively;  𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + ∑ 𝛽2𝑘𝑘𝑘=1 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡𝑘 +  𝜇𝑖 +  𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                     (2) 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽2𝑘𝑘𝑘=1 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡𝑘 +  ∑ 𝛽3𝑖𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑆𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 +  ∑ 𝛽4𝑖 𝑆𝐻𝐴_𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑠=1 +  𝜇𝑖 +  𝛾𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                     (3) 
Where 𝐼𝑖𝑡 and  𝑌𝑖𝑡 represents innovation and economic growth respectively. Innovation and 
growth are measured by the number of scientific articles published and per capita GDP 
respectively. The subscripts  𝑖 and 𝑡 denotes country index and time dimension respectively. 
Visible from the model is an error term with three sub-components: 𝜇𝑖 represents unobserved 
country-specific determinants which is stationary; 𝛾𝑡 stands for the common time specific shocks, 
and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the unobserved determinants that vary over time in a country. The variables institutions, 
stocks and shadow are the categories of control variables pointed by theory in the literature (i.e. 
proxies for political, economic and legal institutions, capital stocks and for the accounting). 
On the estimation approach, with the understanding that the conventional fixed effects and 
OLS estimators according to Nickell (1981) becomes inconsistent when the time span is somehow 
small (Phillips & Sul, 2007), the study relies on three estimation techniques for consistency in 
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robustness: Pooled OLS (POLS), fixed effects4 (FE) and variants of the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) including  instrumental variable (IV). The FE regression controls for omitted 
variables in panel data when the omitted variable vary across entities but do not change over time 
(see Stock & Watson, 2007: pg.356). Our decision to use either the variants of a typical GMM or 
IV is based on an avalanche of factors. For instance, Han and Phillips (2010) argues on the 
superiority of the GMM over the conventional IV on its efficiency in the face of heteroskedasticity. 
Stock and Watson (2007:pg.727) on the other hand explains that an efficient IV estimator is known 
as an efficient GMM when the errors are heteroskedastic. Stock and Watson (2007:pg.730) further 
posits that when the errors are homoscedastic, then the TSLS estimator is asymptotically efficient 
among the class of IV estimators. From these analogies and explanations, there are several classes 
of the GMM and ones decision to use either should be based on the nature of the data and the 
information it elicits through the diagnostic checks undertaken. It should further be noted that 
either of the variants of the GMM is designed to deal with the problem of endogeneity which is 
fundamentally a challenge when addressing issues that borders on institutions. Endogeneity may 
arise from two perspectives: (1) the endogenous variable being correlated with the error term and 
(2) cases of missing variables. Other approaches to bolster our diagnostic checks included an 
attempt to control the condition numbers and variance inflation factors to be lower than 100 and 
10 respectively in each regression.  
 
4. Estimation Results and Discussion 
We begin our analysis with series of diagnostic checks. First, using our correlation matrix 
in Table A2, we are able to infer whether our variables are highly correlated. This procedure partly 
helps by giving firsthand information on multicollinearity. In the said table, none of our variable 
is seen to be collinear except innovation and periodicals. This validates our decision to use 
periodicals as an instrumental variable. Other check on Heteroscedasticity is conducted using a 
statistical test. Our statistical test using the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity on the residuals portrays an insignificant effect (Chi2=11.51, p=0.687). From 
                                                          
4 To avoid the inconsistency of POLS estimation of the AR(1) processes, the FE estimator is chosen. Generally, the 
use of the FE is intentioned at eliminating the unobservable, time-invariant country fixed effects in order to 
eliminate the inconsistency caused by the dependence on the lagged regressors. This is achieved by a so-called 
‘within transformation’(see Acemoglu et al. 2008: pg.814).  
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the Bruech Pagan result, we reject the null hypothesis indicating heteroscedasticity. That is the 
error terms seem to have the same variance (homoscedastic). Therefore using the TSLS method to 
augment the POLS and FE appears to be enough.  
We see innovation as a by-product of institutional development. It takes an effective and 
vibrant institutional set-up to implement and evolve national innovation plan. A well-resourced 
institution has what it takes to spur innovation. We therefore regress the variants of institutional 
factors controlling for human capital on innovation using equation (2). This is in attempt to answer 
the question as to what has been the role of both new and existing institutional frameworks in the 
generation and application of knowledge for a holistic development in the region. Our results from 
the POLS, FE and 2SLS regression are interesting and elicits a number of implications (see Table 
2a and 2b).  
As posited by  Kaufmann et al. (2013) and de la Mothe (2004), institutional quality 
encompasses the process by which a government is selected, monitored and replaced, a 
government’s capacity to effectively formulate and implement sound policies and the economic 
and social interactions between citizens and the state. The use of democracy, the governance 
indicators addresses these concerns as shown in the POLS regression. The study finds press 
freedom which is a component of democracy to be relevant in driving innovation in sub-Sahara 
Africa. Although the effect on a larger scale might seem to be indirect, the following could be 
some of the benefits of press freedom: (1) it ensures a level playing ground for businesses 
especially in the area of exposing corruption, and (2) it supports stable business operation. Press 
freedom promotes innovation. Innovation however, requires diversity of thought and action, as 
well as high level of trust. Therefore countries that outlaw and punish free expression destroy 
societal trust and encourage more even, rigid and narrow forms of thought. 
However, government effectiveness that deals with the formulation of policies and 
regulatory quality had a contrasting impact on innovation policy in the region. Whiles regulatory 
quality which underscores the strength of policy briefs regarding innovation in the region is seen 
to be positive albeit insignificant, it is suggestive of the fact that a lot more needs to be done to 
ignite innovation considering the mixed results from the POLS, FE and TSLS. Property right 
protection after varying the host of control variables still remained significant to suggest property 
right protection could strengthen firms’ incentives to innovate in the region. Our aggregate variable 
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education which is a measure of Human capital (primary, secondary and tertiary enrollments) 
suggest on a consistent manner that human capital in the region has what it takes to be a driver of 
innovation.  Education offers the platform for knowledge to increase the probability to innovate, 
and this is possible through innovative teaching and learning methods. Economic prosperity which 
measures per capita income in the region is seen to be positively and significantly related to the 
level of institutional quality (Table 2b). Without a strong economic progress, financing the 
activities of existing institutions becomes a daunting task let alone to establish new ones to tackle 
emerging challenges. Yet the relation under the FE and TSLS approach although insignificant were 
both seen to be negative. This suggest at one point the rise in income levels provides support for 
building strong institutions and at another jurisdiction frustrates institutional development. This 
relation syncs with our previous discussion on the barriers to the design and implementation of 
STI policies in the region. It should be argued that there is no uniform economic gain in the region. 
Whiles some countries are economically active, others are struggling. Besides, governments in the 
region are saddled with the challenge of raising the much needed resources to push the innovation 
agenda owing to the lack of diversity in the raising of funds to spur innovation. Without a fund 
dedicated for innovation informed by a surge in economic output, the level of prosperity (often in 
the negatives) will continue to dampen both innovation and institutional development.   
Under the TSLS approach in Table 2a (columns 1 - 3), the aggregate of institutional quality 
is regressed on innovation. Institutional quality is seen to dampen innovation. In the said models, 
endogenizing with one of the institutional variants - corruption on the left of the equation 
accompanied by our instrumental variables ethnic linguistic fractionalization and British colony 
on the right hand side. A test of endogeneity was further conducted under which the null hypothesis 
of the variables being exogenous was rejected. Both the Durbin chi-square = 2.736, p= 0.009 and 
Wu- Hausman F-stats = 2.475, p= 0.010 respectively were jointly significant to confirm the 
rejection of the null hypothesis. Therefore we were correct in treating corruption as an endogenous 
variable. We also tested the strength of our instruments and found a partial R2 of 0.86 with an F-
statistic of 38.80. Our F-statistic was larger than all the critical values shown on the table (e.g. 3.92 
– 19.93). Moreover, both the sargan and Basman chi-squares were statistically insignificant 
(p=0.200 and 0.137) to point to the fact that the null hypothesis of the instruments used are valid 
and that our model is correctly specified under the test of over-identifying restrictions. Similar 
procedure is followed in Table 2b on models 1 through 3 respectively. 
Page 18 of 35 
 
Foreign aid inflows and wealth per capita are seen to inhibit institutional quality in Table 
2b.  We theorize that such relation could be possible due to the fact that donors of development 
aid do not necessarily pay attention to better or worse institutions in most cases. Foreign Aids 
come in handy and are meant to achieve certain purposes including to protect the interest of donors 
which in most cases are not made known to the general public. The variable wealth per capita is a 
composite indicator that cuts across the dimensions of sustainability (see Forson et al., 2017; 
Harris, 2000). The mixed results of the relation of wealth per capita lend credence to what 
economic prosperity seem to suggest as both reduce institutional quality. Africa’s true savings 
taking into account the environmental cost associated with pollution, land degradation, 
desertification, and depletion of natural resources at a faster rate could mean the region virtually 
saves nothing when the appropriate deductions are made.  This has what it takes to affect funding 
or investment in research and development leading to less of a sort of innovation.    
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Table 2a. Institutional Development and Innovation in Africa. POLS, FE and IV estimates 
  POLS FE IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
(1) 
2SLS 
(2) 
2SLS 
(3) 
2SLS 
 Innovation 
Specification          
Corruption  21.689 33.187  -90.726*** -95.780*** -27.212* -29.548** 43.798 
  (43.691) (36.856)  (39.163) (32.155) (15.635) (13.037) (45.895) 
Press Freedom  6.343** 2.474  -0.785 -6.589   1.745 
  (2.124) (2.145)  (4.905) (4.492)   (2.275) 
Gov't Effectiveness  -139.931 -75.749  20.652 6.204    
  (87.495) (87.511)  (81.550) (82.005)    
Reg. Quality  239.643*** 157.657**  -105.814 -64.148    
  (56.823) (59.716)  (90.553) (77.360)    
Prop. Right Prop.  1.887** 1.708**  0.881 0.598    
  (0 .839) (0.712)  (0.744) (0.602)    
Size of gov’t        -8.537** -6.069 
        (3.120) (4.363) 
Education   7.781**   5.077***   0.333 
   (1.630)   (1.383)   (1.167) 
Economic Prosperity   -0.873*   -0.407*   275.314* 
   (2.375)   (2.069)   (163.560) 
Gross savings   0.337*   -5.613***   -3.085* 
   (2.813)   (2.521)   (1.812) 
Institutional Qual. -231.53*  -210.940*** -282.871*  -114.000* -414.370** -363.244** -300.462* 
 (132.83)  (44.357) (150.160)  (59.476) (134.423) (114.611) (116.841) 
Constant 740.46*** -275.632 -608.651*** 774.232*** -316.224 -342.723* 147.295** 208.310*** -838.962* 
 (131.34) (177.289) (141.735) (105.03) (283.447) (265.890) (56.231) (54.000) (368.772) 
          
Year Dummy No      No     No     Yes Yes  Yes Yes    Yes    Yes    
Country Dummy No     No     No     Yes Yes  Yes Yes    Yes    Yes    
Observation 84 98 120 84 98 120 84 98 120 
 R2 0.012 0.71 0.90 0.016 0.40 0.72 0.874 0.914 0.962 
F/Wald Chi2       113.72 172.76 408.45 
       [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Note:  Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
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Table 2b. Innovation and Institutional quality: POLS, FE and IV estimates 
  POLS FE IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
(1) 
2SLS 
(2) 
2SLS 
(3) 
2SLS 
 Institutional Quality    
Specifications  
        
Corruption
 
 
-0.003 
-0.077***  -0.005 0.014 0.096* -0.399 -0.525** 
  (0.026) (0.034)  (0.015) (0.023) (0.181) (0.183) (0.239) 
Press Freedom  0.013*** 
  0.008  0.002 0.006***  -0.019** 0.002 
  (0.002) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.007) (0.009) 
Foreign Aid Inflows  -0.178*** -0.213***  -0.008 -0.094***  -0.128 -0.137 
  (0.040) (0 .043)  (0.012) (0.036)  (0.165) (0.161) 
Wealth per capita  -0.006*** 0.004  -0.001*** -0.005***  0.004 0.016* 
  (0.001) (0 .003)  (0.000) (0.002)  (0.006) (0.009) 
Natural Resource   0.020***   -0.003   0.052** 
   (0 .003)   (0.003)   (0.024) 
Education  
 0.002   0.0003   0.011 
   (0 .001)   (0.0009)   (0.008) 
Economic Prosperity  
 0.020***   -0.119   -2.482 
   (0.003)   (0.292)   (1.681) 
Gross Savings  
 -0.014***   0.0003   -0.026* 
   (0.005)   (0.003)   (0.013) 
Innovation -0.0001* 
 -2.46 -0.0001*  -0.0001*** -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.002 
 (0.00003)  (0.000) (0 .00003)  (0.00002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Constant 0.689*** 1.668*** 2.400*** 0.689*** 0.459*** 1.094 -0.303 3.053* 8.478* 
 (0.051) (0.403) (0.582) (0.023) (0.193) (0.831) (0.214) (1.702) (4.716) 
          
Year Dummy No    No    No     Yes Yes Yes Yes    Yes    Yes    
Country Dummy No    No    No     Yes Yes  Yes Yes    Yes    Yes    
Observation 108 489 189 108 489 189 108 489 189 
 R2 0.012 0.354 0.695 0.016 0.015 0.356 0.654 0.647 0.73 
F/Wald Chi2        44.84 48.94 65.61 
 
 
 
 
 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Note:  Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
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Assessing the link between innovation and economic growth in Table 3 indicates the 
former contributes significantly to wellbeing in Africa. Nonetheless, we can deduce that 
innovation maybe endogenously correlated with the error term. We look for a variable that is linked 
to innovation and indirectly connected to economic growth. We make a case that the variable 
periodicals may be directedly related to innovation but not economic growth. We conducted a test 
of endogeneity in which the null hypothesis of the variables being exogenous was rejected. Both 
the Durbin chi-square and Wu- Hausman F-statistics were jointly significant to confirm the 
rejection of the null hypothesis. Therefore we were correct in treating innovation as an endogenous 
variable. We also tested the strength of our instrumental variable and found a partial R2 of 0.92 
and 0.96 with an F-statistic of 76.134 and 318.309 respectively. Our F-statistics was larger than 
all the critical values. Both the sargan and Basman chi-squares were statistically insignificant to 
point to the fact that the null hypothesis of the instrument (periodical) is valid and that our model 
is correctly specified under the test of over-identifying restrictions (see Table 3).  
The contribution of innovation to the region’s growth was just 0.014 percentage point and 
increased to 0.015 percentage point in models (2) under the 2SLS approach. It is also important to 
note that the significant rise in the coefficient of innovation in model (2) could be attributed to the 
attempt at improving the activities of institutions. We also find savings to be negatively related to 
economic growth in Table 3. Though the normative idea has been that savings in the generic 
stimulates economic growth, in the case of Africa saving rates are lower on average (15%) which 
accounts for the inverse relationship. The effect of agriculture through value addition is seen to be 
significantly negative in model (1). The application of knowledge and inventions thrives on 
financial resources and saving is a means to actualize this. We interact innovation and institutional 
quality to capture its effect on economic development. Our interaction elicits a mixed result. We 
find our interaction effect weakens economic development further. Thus from an initial positive 
0.007 percentage point to a negative coefficient of 0.012 down to 0.021 from our TSLS approach. 
This implies with the right mix of ideas, institutional bottlenecks can be resolved to enhance 
growth in all facet of the economy. The negative relation is informed by the challenges institutions 
are encumbered with in the design and implementation of innovation in the region as discussed 
previously. 
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Table 3. Innovation and Economic Growth in sub-Sahara Africa: IV estimates 
    Economic Growth   
 
(1) 
1SLS 
(2) 
2SLS 
(1) 
1SLS 
(2) 
2SLS 
 coefficient of corresponding instrumental variable 
Variable Instrumented     
Innovation  0.014**  0.015* 
  (0.005)  (0.012) 
     
Instruments     
Innovation -0.007  -0.002  
 (0.006)  (0.013)  
Natural Resources  -0.038   
  (0.258)   
Foreign Aid  -2.691**   
  (1.316)   
Economic Prosperity  -7.577*   
  (4.169)   
Investment in Education  0.910   
  (0.316)   
Education   -0.259* -0.120 
   (0.142) (0.108) 
Agric. (value added)   -0.862*** 0.663 
   (0.246) (0.406) 
Population growth    7.707*** 
    (1.335) 
Savings    -0.008 
    (0.047) 
Interaction (institution*innov.) 0.007** -0.012*** 0.002 -0.021*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) 
Corruption    10.568*** 
    (3.137) 
     
Constant 2.412* 40.620* 6.722 -53.042*** 
 (1.263) (22.332) (19.080) (14.843) 
Year Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
     
Observation 120 142 180 220 
Adj. R2 0.058 0.920 0.266 0.980 
Wald Chi2  47.06***  58.91*** 
Durbin Chi2  5.884**  5.065** 
Wu-Hausman F- stats  5.111**  4.280** 
IV First-stage F-statistics  76.134***  318.309*** 
Note:  Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
Expanding on the role of foreign aid, it is worth taking a throwback of the number of 
programs and projects organized by UNESCO to build technological drive for innovation in 
Africa. Series of workshops and training programs have been organized with funding coming from 
foreign governments through aid. That notwithstanding, portion of the results validates assertions 
by other schools of thought that aid has not been beneficial to the progress of the region. It has 
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been argued that aid contributes in creating macroeconomic challenges such as increasing the stock 
of money supply which leads to high inflation. Yet there are no systematic evidence of aid 
increasing inflation, or reducing the amount of credit to promote private businesses. Africa’s 
governance challenges predicated on corruption is owed to a larger extent on foreign aid inflows. 
For instance in the study conducted by Ohler et al. (2012) on the operation of the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation (MCC) on aids to some developing economies did uncover a strong 
anticipation effect soon after the agency had announced the release of funds. Such a move increases 
uncertainty in recipient countries as well as weakens the incentive to fight the menace (Awoonor 
& Forson, 2020; Forson et al., 2020; Forson et al., 2015). 
The impact of education on growth can be observed to be negatively significant. The 
ensuing situation could be explained from the following perspectives. First innovation emanates 
from human resource, most specifically the science and engineering fields but the number of 
students pursuing science and engineering continues to be least among the different fields of study 
in the region. Secondly, the colonial origin of skewed school enrolment which most countries in 
the region were exposed to seems to be at variance with their modern objective of industrialization.  
It should be readily pointed out that sub-Sahara Africa was colonized by the French, British, 
Portuguese, Danish and Germans. 
 
5. Conclusion and Policy Recommendation 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between innovations and 
economic in sub-Sahara Africa. We control for institutional quality informed by the financing of 
government agencies. This is against the backdrop that institution is the oil that greases the wheels 
of development. Using the number of scientific journals published as proxy for innovation and 
GDP per capita for economic growth, we assessed a panel of 25 economies in sub-Sahara Africa.  
Our evidence suggest among other things that innovation has a positive and significant 
effect on the growth trajectory of sub-Sahara Africa although the impact seems negligible. 
Institutional quality is seen to dampen innovation and the relation is persistent regardless of when 
the focus is on aggregate or decomposed institutional factors. While most countries in the region 
have invested in establishing institutional frameworks, we find barriers to the design and 
implementation of STI policies account for the sluggish contribution of innovation to the growth 
pattern in the region.  
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Governments in the region ought to take all necessary steps to develop national evaluation 
and STI data stand. The success of this approach will be contingent on the region first of all being 
able to evolve a specific conceptual and methodological tools for monitoring and assessing STI 
policies. Area of financing STI policies and coordination among state institutions have to be 
reconsidered. Tax incentives and havens for technology related businesses ought to be given 
priority to augment already existing instruments such as export-led instruments. Governments in 
the region must work in close partnership with financial institutions in boosting entrepreneurial 
spirit through innovative support to enterprises that are into inventions and discoveries. 
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Appendix: 
Table A-1: Summary Statistics and Presentation of Countries 
Variables Years Description Mean Std. Dev. Source 
 
 PANEL A: Summary Statistics 
 
  
Innovation 1980-2015 The number of scientific articles published in journals in the region 486.27 1370 World Bank 
Corruption Index 1996-2015 Perceived level of corruption. Countries ranked on a scale of 10 (very clean) to 0 (highly 
corrupt). 3.181 1.143 
Transparency 
International 
GDP per capita 1970-2015 Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currency. 1.114 6.776 World Bank 
Wealth per capita 1980-2015 True level of investment and disinvestment in the productive base of an economy after 
adjustments (degradation, deforestation and pollution) -2.245 2.384 World Bank 
Agric. (Value added) 1980-2015 
Agriculture includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and 
livestock production. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs 
and subtracting intermediate inputs. 
27.90 16.39 World Bank 
Education 1970-2015 Aggregate total enrollments in primary, secondary and tertiary education, regardless of age. 42.25 27.93 World Bank 
Population Growth 1970-2015 Exponential rate of growth of midyear population. 2.663 0.852 World Bank 
Gross Savings 1970-2015 Gross savings are calculated as gross national income less total consumption, plus net transfers. 15.26 10.80  
Natural Resources 1970-2015 Sum of all rents (natural gas, coal (hard and soft), mineral, and forest). 11.967 13.755 World Bank 
Foreign Aid 1970-2015 Logarithm of Aid inflow is the transfer of capital for the benefit of recipient country or its population. 8.147 0.742 World Bank 
Economic Prosperity 1970-2015 A proxy of natural logarithm of per capita gross domestic product in a given country (constant, 2005 US$). 2.817 0.381 World Bank 
Gov't Effectiveness 1996-2015 The quality of public services,  civil service and the degree of independence from political pressures, ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, higher  values =  better governance outcomes. -0.290 0.523 WGI 
Economic Freedom 1998-2015 A measure of the fundamental right of every human to control labor and property. Countries ranked on a scale of 100 (very free) to 0 (less free). 57.826 5.118 Heritage Foundation 
Press Freedom 1996-2015 The degree to which country permits the free flow of news and information. Scored from 0 (best) to 100 (worst). 45.237 14.780 Freedom House 
Periodicals  1996-2015 Citable documents that includes articles, reviews, magazines, newspapers, conference proceedings etc. 779.981 2063.102 Elsevier Scimagor  
British colony 1970-2015 Dummy variables for countries colonized by Britain or otherwise 1= Britain, 0 = otherwise 0.29 0.45 Flags of the world 
Size of Gov’t 1970-2015 The four components that indicates the extent to which countries rely on the political process to allocate resources and goods and services.                                   6.231 1.060 
Economic Freedom 
of the World (EFW) 
Ethnic Linguistic 
Fractionalisation 1980-2015 
The probability that two random individuals in a population belong to different groups and 
percentage of population without similar language 0.758 0.125 
Alesina et al. (2002; 
Roeder (2001) 
Institutional quality 1996-2015  Aggregate governance indicators (gov’t effectiveness, Regulatory quality, rule of law, bureaucracy etc.). -0.220 0.480 WGI 
  PANEL B: Presentation of countries (25) 
 
  
Zimbabwe, Ghana, Cameroun, Kenya, Congo, Rep., Nigeria, South Africa, Mali, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Liberia, Senegal, Togo 
Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Côte d'Ivoire, Namibia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Angola. 
Source: Authors’ construct  
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Table A-2: Correlation matrix 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Innovation (1) 1                    
Agric. (2)  -0.271*  1                   
GDP growth (3) 0.019 0.056 1                  
Education (4) 0.091 -0.473*  0.021 1                 
British Colony (5) -0.202*  -0.193* 0.013 0.054   1                
Ethnic-Linguistic Fract. (6) 0.152  -0.043 -0.053 0.244*  -0.102 1               
Press Freedom (7) -0.215*   0.084*  -0.135* 0.1313*    0.0384  -0.1981*   1              
Pop. growth (8) -0.244  0.116*   0.264*  0.022  0.318*  0.007 -0.042 1             
Savings (9) 0.033 -0.295*  0.105*  0.229*  0.039 0.387*  0.159* -0.035 1            
Natural Res. (10) -0.024 0.081*  -0.051 0.139*  0.039  0.333* -0.204* -0.045  0.115*  1           
 Foreign Aid (11) 0.147*  -0.002 -0.028 0.111* 0.026  -0.130*  0.075* -0.004 -0.036 -0.004 1          
Econ. Prosperity (12) 0.353*   -0.761*   0.055 0.379*   0.689*   0.293*  0.235* -0.110 0.345*  -0.058 -0.327*  1         
Corruption (13) 0.275*   -0.452*  0.098*  0.116*  0.496*  0.138*  0.351* -0.140*  0.362* -0.357*  0.022 0.528*  1        
 Gov’t Eff. (14)  0.365*  -0.476*  0.108*  0.042 0.432*  -0.159*  0.455* -0.045 0.155* -0.486 0.073*  0.474*  0.812*  1       
  Reg. Qual. (15)  0.299*  -0.274*   0.124*  0.031 0.308*  -0.135* 0.533* 0.031  0.161* -0.447*  0.036 0.356*  0.706*   0.8724*  1      
 Prop. Right (16)  0.5947* 0.348*  -0.099 -0.090  -0.316* -0.127 -0.040 0.051 0.155 -0.203*  -0.050 -0.048 -0.251* -0.1245 0.0184 1     
 Size of Gov’t (17) -0.263    -0.077  -0.072 0.054 -0.198* 0.1420   -0.264* -0.261* 0.179* 0.074 -0.130 0.1403 -0.042 -0.125  -0.207* -0.028 1    
 Investment in Education(18) 0.2647* -0.297*   0.046  0.221* 0.147* -0.398* -0.108*  -0.044 0.208*  -0.094 0.012  0.266* 0.171*    0.110  -0.040 -0.2255 0.0228 1   
 Periodicals  (19) 0.994*   -0.284*    -0.015 0.109*  -0.160*  0.095 0.250* -0.233*  0.017  -0.057  0.104* 0.348* 0.283*    0.393* 0.307* 0.360* 0.077 -0.241* 1  
Wealth per capital (20)  0.0427*  -0.1712*  0.0419  -0.1435 *  0.2292*  0.456*  0.5061* -0.3395 0.5585 *  -0.6537* -0.0051 0.1903 *  0.4980 *  0.4171 0.4032 -0.1180* -0.0396 * 0.3270 -0.0347 1 
Note: Significant at *p < 0.05 
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Table A-3: sub-Sahara Africa - science, technology and innovation policy 
Source: Authors elaboration 
Note: Empty cells refers to non-availability of policy instruments
Policy Instruments Nigeria South Africa Ghana Kenya Tanzania 
Institutional Framework      
1. National Plan of STI * * * * * 
2. Evaluating of STI policies      
3. Technology forecast exercise      
4. Administration Organization * * * * * 
(a) Regional (subnational) STI       
(b) Regional (subnational ) STI Organization      
(c) Coordination mechanism among public organizations in charge of STI policies * * * * * 
5.  Public education system: national strategy   * * * 
      (a) Strategy to promote mathematics and sciences in primary and secondary 
education * * * * * 
      (b) Strategy to promote science and engineering in undergraduates and 
postgraduate education * * * * * 
6. Legislative Instruments    *  
Financing      
7. Fiscal incentives      
(a) Specifically designed for R&D expenditures     
8. Direct subsidies for R&D activities      
      (a) Competitive funds      
9. Innovation financing      
     (a)Public loan guarantees      
     (b)Public funds to commercialize innovations     
10.  Government Budget (% of GDP) * * * * * 
Interaction and Diffusion      
11. Program to interaction among the actors of the innovation system 
 
    
      (a) Program to foster public-private joint research 
 
*    
      (b) Program to promote personnel exchange and secondments between universities 
and firms 
 
*  *  
12. Public incubators  *  *       
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